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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOHNSON READY-MIX CONCRETE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 9247 
RESPONDENTS ADDITIONAL STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
Since the statement of facts contained in appellant's 
brief are not considered sufficient to give the court a 
clear and concise picture of the proceedings below, this 
additional state1nent of facts is sub1nitted. 
For some year~ the plaintiff carried a public liabil-
ity Insurance Policy with the defendant United Pacific 
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In~urance Company. On May 12, 1954, one Blazer while 
working as a cement finisher received a bump on his 
back against one of plaintiff's concrete mixer trucks. 
The n1a tter vvas considered to be a trivial one by all the 
persons present at the time and neither Johnson or his 
office Inanager knew anything about it until May 14, 
1957, when Johnson received a letter from Attorney 
C~harles Olsen stating that Mr. Blazer had a cause of 
action for personal injuries growing out of the May 12th 
accident. Johnson then promptly reported the matter 
to the defendant insurance company and attorney Olson 
brought suit against J-ohnson for Blazer. The Insurance 
Co1npany declined to defend the Blazer action, Johnson 
employed his O"\Vn council and eventually paid a judg-
n1ent against hi1n in that action. This is an action on 
Johnson's Insurance policy against the defendant Com-
pany for dan1ages for failure to defend the Blazer action 
and to pay the judg1nent in that case as required by the 
ter1ns of the policy. The case was tried to a jury where 
the plaintiff had a verdict and judg1nent against the 
defendant for the amount of the judgment paid by him 
plus attorneys fees. 
No con1plaint is n1ade here as to the an1ount of the 
verdict the only errors assigned being as to the instruc-
tions of the court which submitted to the jury the 
question of "rhether defendant Johnson had notice of 
the accident and (2) whether it reasonable appeared 
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to be so trivial as not to require reporting to Insurance 
Con1pany. 
On the 12th day of :\Jay, 1954, w·hen the InJury 
oeeulTed to ~f r. Blazer, it is apparent fro1n the record. 
that no one, including ~·I r. Blazer, treated his InJUries 
other than as a trivial n1atter. Mr. Blazer himself 
testified that he only rnissed two-days vvork in two 
n1onths (R255). 
According to his own testimony (R257), he states 
that he had informed sorneone he called, that "he had 
had a minor accident.'' He called on the third day 
after the accident to sorneone in Johnson's office, but 
he did not knovv to vvhorn he was talking, but he said he 
asked for the bookkeeper (R258) and he couldn't re-
member \vhat the person on the other end of the call 
said. ....;\..nd, it was not until counsel for appellant sug-
gested that it was the bookkeeper (R258) that he said, 
"I think he said he vvas the bookkeeper." The book-
keeper, Mr. Quinney, denied that he ever talked to }fr. 
Blazer (R223). 1fr. Blazer doesn't recall whether the 
party on the other end of the line did anything but 
answer the phone, as he could not recall anything that 
was said by that party (R259). 
Mr. Olsen, the driver of the truck talked to hirn 
son1e time during the summer when he was again deliv-
ering concrete to Mr. Blazer and asked him how he "Tas 
getting along, and Mr. Blazer replied that he was getting 
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along \vith his work and did not make any mention 
\vhatsoever about his injuries (R266). And upon cross-
exalnina tion ~1r. Olsen further stated ( R267), and this 
was sometilne in the su1nmer of 1954, that Blazer told 
hin1 that he thought he would be all right and he didn't 
think that it (the accident) had hurt him, and Olsen at 
the time of the accident tried to get him (Blazer) to let 
him (Olsen) take him to the doctor, but Blazer refused 
to go to the doctor (R263-264). 
It should be borne in mind that the witness, Mr. 
Olsen, was called on behalf of the appellant and \vas 
not at the tin1e of the trial working for Johnson: and 
when Mr. Olsen talked to ~fr. Taggart, the batch plant 
n1an for Johnson, he testified on direct examination 
that he did not tell l\ir. Taggart that Blazer had been 
hurt seriously (R268). 
As further indication that ~1r. Blazer hin1self treat-
ed the n1atter onl:~ as trivial, the record shows (R273-
27 4-275) he never testified that he talked ·w-ith Taggart 
about it. The very day after the accident (the \Vord Jan-
uar~~ is in error in the record and it should be the 
n1onth of l\tfay) and on at least seven occasions shortly 
thereafter~ Blazer ordered concrete personally from 
Tag-gart, and on none of these occasions did he say any-
thing at all about his injury. Taggart testified that one 
tin1e (R276) Blazer called hiin and told hi1n that a truck 
had "bumped" him, but the record shows that Taggart 
l1arl jnfornlatjon~ or at least believed, that Blazer was 
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suffering frou1 a previou~ injury to his back (R277), 
and as coun:--;el ~tates in his brief, the mattPr vvas neYer 
brought to .\I r. Quinney's attention according to the 
testilnon)~ of Taggart and Olsen (P. :-~). Taggart's 
te~tirnony is to the effect that at one tirne before the 
accident he called on Blazer (R277) at Blazer's horne 
where he \Vas crippled up with his back at the tirne; so 
that the verdict of the jur_v under the instructions of the 
Court \vould arnount to the finding that all parties 
treated the n1atter as so trivial as not to require the1n 
to give notice to the insurance cornpany. 
Finally, the facts are that neither Johnson or any of 
the officers of his cornpany, knew of this matter until 
they \Vere served notice of the clain1 of 11r. Blazer 
against Johnson by the attorney for Mr. Blazer, Charles 
P. Olson on May 14, 1957 (Pl.'s Ex. No. 11). Thus, 
the rnatter rested, so far as Johnson or any of his 
ernployees "\vere concerned, in cornplete silence fron1 a 
few days after the accident until receipt of the Olson 
letter, during vvhich time 1\[r. Blazer was undergoing 
rnedical and surgical treatment and hospitalization and 
incurring large bills, for vvhich Johnson has fully paid 
and now claims reimbursen1ent under the policy written 
b~,. the appellant. 
Johnson did everything possible to get the appel-
lant to defend the suit under the terms of the policy, but 
it declined to defend the same, refusing on the grounds 
that it had not been notified as soon as practicable (See 
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.b~xhibits 3 to 13 inclusive). Johnson finally e1nployed 
his own attorney~. These exhibits were not admitted in 
evidence, but their contents were stipulated to (R206). 
~~he record and exhibits a1nply show that the matter 
''Tas diligently pursued by Johnson after such notice was 
had fro1n attorney Olson that the insurance company 
had every possible opportunity given it to take over the 
defense after it had 1nade its complete investigation 
of the case. 
1T nder the instructions of the Court given for and 
guidance upon a sub1nitted general verdict, the jury has 
found that the n1atter \vas of such a trivial nature that 
a rea~onahle 1nan would not he expected to report the 
n1atter and it \vould be an excuse for failing to notify 
the eon1pany, and further found apparently that under 
the circu1nstances, the notice to the con1pany finally \vas 
"Tit hin a reasonable tin1e. 
The reeord sho,vs that the jury clearly had in mind 
the question of \vhether or not the in~urance con1pany 
had been notified af' soon a~ practicable, because the 
jury returned to the eonrtroon1 ":herein the following-
proceeding~ took place (R320). 
'' ... son1e question about the n1eaning of the phrase 
'a~ soon as practicable· 1nean~ that the notiee must be 
given \vithin a reasonable ti1ne under the eireumstances 
of thP ca~e. Tn~tantaneous notice i~ not contemplated, 
hnt rather notice to he g-iYen \vith reasonable dispatch 
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and \vithin a rPaHonabh~ ti1ue in viP\\' of all the faet:s 
and circtnnstance8 of the case. Now tnayhe that may not 
be ver:, helpful, but that i8 a legal definition.'' 
P()INT I 
rrHE Ql':BJ~ri,ION OF vVHETHER OR NOT 
,JOHNSON READY-~fiX HAD NOTICE OF THE 
~;\CCIDENrl., W--:\S PROPERJjl'r SlTBMirl111ED TO THE 
Jl-:-RY. 
POINT Il 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS PROPERLY Slrg_ 
J\1:ITTED TO THE JlTRY. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD CLEARI_jY ESTABLISHES THAT 
THE JURY DETERMINED THE ISSlTES IN 
FA \TOR OF THE PI_jAINTIFF. 
POINT I\T 
ANY ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 
COURT IN THIS C.A.SE WOULD NOT HA \:'"E 
AFFECTED THE FINAL RESULT AND WOlTLD 
THEREFORE BE HAR:\IIJESS. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE Qr'"ESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT 
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JOHNSON READY-MIX HAD NOTICE OF THE 
ACCIDENT WAS PROPERI~Y SlTBMITTED TO THE 
J1TRY. 
The final issues sub1nitted by the court to the Jury 
\\TP l'P aR f 0ll0\\1S : ( 1{148) 
1. WaR any notice of the accident ever received by 
the plaintiff corporation prior to May, 1957 ~ 
2. Did the accident appear so trivial or minor 
(even though plaintiff found out about it \vi thin a few 
days should you so find) as to not require that notice 
of it be given to the defendant? 
3. (If the two above are resolved in favor of the 
plaintiff) H O\V 1nuch should he recover~ 
As to these issues submitted to the Jury the court in 
In~truction No. 4 and No. 9 stated the respective partiec 
theories in the alternative and left the matter for the 
Jlll'~TO 
The only testimony relied upon by the appellant 
to establish that ~fr. Taggart had authority to receive 
notice of the accident \Yas the testin1ony of Mr. Quinney 
that he had instructed Taggart that if he had knowledge 
of an arrirlent to report it to the offiee (R224-225). 
l\{r. Taggart aeeording to his o\vn testimony only 
had authority to send drivers to different place, "There-
ever the orders were ealled for (R270). Aecording to 
l\f r. tTohnson 's testin1ony speaking of Taggart's respons-
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ibilities ~'he'd get orders for concrete, he'd dispatch the 
various trucks to different jobs (R246). 
Counsel argues that the evidence was without con-
flict that Taggart had authority to receive notice of 
accidents involving Ready lVI ix truck drivers and relay 
such ~7 at-ice to Jlf r. Quinney. 
rrhere is SOUle confuBion in the record grO\Ving OUt 
or the Courts sustaining the objection to the testimony 
of ~lr. Quinne:v \vith respect to how clain1s in insurance 
cases "\V"ere processed by the co1npany that the clai1ns 
were all processed through his ( Quinneys) office and 
that he kne\v of no other or individual agent or en1ployee 
that 'vas authorized to process clain1s of this nature. 
(R215). 
However Mr. Quinney did testify 
Q. Do you know of any instance where any person 
other than through your office has ever processed a 
claim~ 
_._t\.. T don't. 
Q. Or how many claims - could you just tell me 
whether there have been a few or several claims made 
by your company against the United Pacific Insurance 
Company~ 
A. There have been several. 
Q. And who processed those ·claims. 
A. I did. 
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r:J~I-LBJ COlTRrr (To Attorney Christensen): You 
a<hnit that he (Quinne~T) took care of the insurance 
husine~~ for the (jompany. 
~IR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, we adn1it that he 
handled, through l-Jatch ~;\gency, the placing-
r-PHF~ COr;RT: A.nd con1municated through to your 
con1pan:·. He \Ya~ the co1nmunicating officer. 
~1R. CHRISTENSEN: "Yes" (R217). 
Then on cross examination Quinney at (R224) 
testified he as office manager instructed the employees 
including Taggart that they should report accidents to 
the offiee. 
_l. \t page 225 of the record Quinney testified: 
Q. (By Atty. Chri~tensen) : Did you giYe any In-
~truetion~ to ~[r. Taggart \Yith respeet to telling the 
driYer~ \vhat the proeeedure "-as in connection \vith re-
porting accidents? 
A. Yes. 
(~. ~\nd \\"hat did you tell ~lr. Taggart 1n that 
regard~ 
.:\. Thnt if w·e had an accident to report it. 
Q. ln other \Vords~ the trurk driYers \Yere to report 
an:· aeeident~ of "Thieh they kne":- to \Yho, to you or to 
Mr. Taggart~ 
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~\. Well to either one a.s lon9 as it got to the office. 
(Our e1nphasis). 
(~uinne~' tPstified that he \Vas the only e111plo~Te in 
the office PXe(·pt }Irs. Johnson helped hi1n oecasionally. 
(R223). 
'That Blazer never talked to hiin about the Blazer 
accident (R250), and he knew nothing of the accident 
until he received attorney Olson's letter in 1957 (R219). 
It is ~ub1nitted that the proceedure outlined i~ a 
reasonable Inethod of proceeding to get the information 
to the one officer in the organization who could then 
notify the insurance company in orderly manner, he 
being acl1uainted "\Vith the practice in processing such 
matter, and that it surely does not establish as a 1natter 
of la-\v that the knowledge of Taggart "\vas kno,vledge to 
the co1npany of the Blazer accident. 
It is respectfully submitted that this evidence is a 
far cry from undisputed evidence that Taggart \vas 
such an officer of the Company that notice to Taggart 
was notice to the Co1npany. All it really establishes 
that Taggart like the other employes including the 
drivers were instructed to report any accident coming 
to their knowledge to Mr. Quinney at the office. 
The court apparently interpreted this evidence to 
present a jury question not as to whether Taggart kne\v 
of the bump but 
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1. Was Taggart such an agent or officer of the 
C~orporation that .notice to him 'vas notice to the corp-
oration-~ 
2. If Taggart did receive notice of the accident, 
whether he properly concluded that the accident was so 
trivial that it need not be reported. 
The first question, now complained of by appellant 
n1ight well have been decided by the court that there 
'vas insufficient evidence of Taggart being an authorized 
officer of the Corporation that notice to him was notice 
to the corporation. The court left the matter to the 
jury which action was in appellants favor and ought not 
to be complained of now. The jury very properly inter-
preted the evidence to establish that Taggart was a 
bateh n1ixer and dispatcher of cen1ent and not an officer 
of the corporation to reeeive notice of accidents and re-
port the ~arne to·the insurance con1pany. -\"Vhile there n1ay 
not have been direct disputes in the evidence as to Tag-
gart's duty to report the accident to the office the court 
apparently felt that the eYidenre "~as such that n1ore than 
one interpretation of the evidence 'vas possible and for 
that reason subn1itted the question to the jury, as 
follows: 
"If the jury believes that the witness Taggart was 
a ~upervising agent or a person authorized to accept 
notice for and on behalf of the plaintiff, then whatever 
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notice Taggart had of the accident is notice to the plain-
tiff. 
lf, on the other hand, you find that Taggart was a 
1n~re bateh plant operator with authority to mix the 
('Pinent, reePive orders for cen1ent and dispatch the haul-
Pr . ...; to the respective customers 'vith no supervisory or 
other such authority or power in the conduct of the busi-
nP~~ of the corporation then notice to Taggart would not 
be notice to the plaintiff'' (In st. No. 9 R155). 
It is submitted this instruction is most favorable to 
the appellant and one about which he can have no just 
complaint. The jury had a right to find and by the great 
preponderance of the evidence could only find that the 
secretary and office manager, Quinney, was the person 
who was to receive notice of all claims and process them 
(R240-217). There was no error in submitting the 
que~tions to tlH-' jury. 
Counsel cites the case of Olsen, et al., v Warwood, 
et al., 123 1T tah 11, 255 P .2d 725 ( 1953). In that case 
con1plaint was made of an instruction that in weighing 
evidence pertaining to the drivers alleged negligence it 
was the jury's duty to consider it under all the facts and 
circumstances existing at the time of the accident and 
not to consider it as a jury would in looking back on the 
events from a later date. The instruction was approved 
by the court and while the court there stated that there 
must be evidence upon which to base and instruction, it 
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said at page 728, "It is manifest however, that a jury 
rnay find any fact which must reasonably and of neces-
sity flow frou1 other facts which were in evidence''. 
This case does not support appellants proposition that 
the instruction in thi8 case is in error. 
The case of Woolverton v. Fidelity and Casualty 
Company of New York, (N.Y., 1907) 82 N. E. 7 45, cited 
by appellant held that knowledge of a driver \Yho cau~ed 
an accident is not imputed to the insured, and the case 
is distinguishable from the case at bar in that there is 
no evidence that Taggart was authorized in the natural 
conduct of business to receive reports of accidents, other 
than to report them to the office. (R225). 
The Oregon case of Hoffman v. Employers Liability 
Assur. Corp., Ltd., (Ore., 1934) 29 P.2d 557, cited by the 
appellant with extensive quotes, was a somewhat sin1ilar 
case as to this case. The portions quoted in appellants 
brief are not the parts of the decision that controls the 
case and a judgment in that case in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the insurance company was affirmed. The 
trial court in the case at page 564 found that agent 
Donaca's information as to the happening of the accident 
was so indefinite and uncertain in its nature as to con-
stitute no notice to the plaintiff that an accident covered 
by the policy had happened. The case was decided by a 
divided court but the majority concluded that the in-
sured had not received notice of sufficient facts to give 
notice to the insurance company. 
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rrhP }aRt ('H~e eited h)~ the appellants under this point 
was Latses r. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 lTtah 214, 104 P.2d 
()19 ( 1 ~)--l-0) has no hearing upon this case. The question 
\\·n~ \\~hether notice of i1nprove1nents on the owners 
prPini~(·~ h)~ tla· tenant 'vas ilnputable to the owner for 
the purpo~P of e~tablishing that tl1e O"\vner acted in bad 
l'aith and it \vas held not evidence of bad faith. The facts 
in this case have no application to establish any rule 
applicable to the law in the case at bar. 
_...\s to the second question sub1nitted to the jury to-
2. Did the accident appear so trivial or minor (even 
though plaintiff found out about it within a few days, 
should you so find) as to not require that notice of it 
he given to defendant?" (Instruction No. 2, R.148). 
The testimon~~ of ~~r r. Taggart clearly indicates that 
he c-onsidered the bump to Blazer to be a trivial or Ininor 
1natter. This is evident when he stated in answer to a 
que~tion by ~r r. Christensen (R.270). 
Q. "\\T1Jen did you first hear anything at all about 
that (speaking of the accident). 
A. It was \Yithin the next day or two. He called 
me on the telephone, placing an order. In doing so he 
mentioned that he had been bumped by one of the 
trucks.'' 
Q. Now, I asked you what he said. 
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A. Well, that a truck had backed up and he had got 
bumped in the back son1e. He didn't say that he \Vas 
hurt seriously or anything of the kind.'' 
Q. Did you later make any follow up of that report 
by ~Jr. Blazer~'' 
.. A._. "No. We n1ade no follow-up. Well, we just 
thought it was a trivial matter, because he hadn't see1ned 
very jmpressed about it, and there was nothing further 
said. We thought if he had been injured he'd certainly 
have let us kno"T how badly'' ( R.271 see also R.272). 
According to Mr. Taggart, Blazer never complained 
of the injury (R.272, R.278) and he never kne\v anyn1ore 
about it until almost 3 years later (R.272). This even 
though Blazer placed numerous orders for cement com-
mencing the day following the accident, May 13~ 1954 
and for several days thereafter throughout the year 
(R.275 ). 
It is therefore apparent that the action of Blazer 
lead Taggart and all others who know of the accident 
to believe that this was a trivial matter and therefore 
the law does not require that notice of this sort of acci-
dent to be given. The rule is set forth in 18 ALB. 2d 
443,4 75 as follows : 
''Since the requirement that notice of the 
occurrence of an accident ·be given refers only to 
accident which caused a loss covered by the policy, 
delay in giving notice is generally held excusable 
in case of an accident which is trivial and re-
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sult in no apparent har1n, or which furnishes no 
ground for the insured, acting as a reasonable 
and prudent rnan, to believe at the time that a 
clai1n for dan1age will arise. (See cases cited in 
annotation at page 475). 
The test of this rule seerns to be : 
''When there has been such an occurence or 
accident as would lead the ordinary prudent and 
reasonable man to believe that it might give rise 
to a clai1n for damages.'' Nye v. Louis Ostrove 
Shoe Co. (1942 Ohio App) 43 N.E. 2d 103, 18 ALR 
2d 475. 
The annotation continue8: 
''Another case in which the doctrine of trivial 
occurrence has been defined with lucidity and 
clarity is Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Anderson's 
Groves, Inc. (1949. CA 5th Fla) 176 F. 2d 246, 
\Yhere the court stated that the duty of an jn-
sured under the provision of an automobile lia-
bility policy requiring him to give the insurer 
written notice of an accident ''as soon as prac-
ticable'' does not mean that every trivial accident 
that occurs should be reported, but only an acci-
dent that an ordinarily prudent individual acting 
reasonably would consider, under all the circum-
stances, as consequential and which could afford 
the basis of a claim. The court added the rule 
that not every trivial mishap or occurrence must 
be reported applies even though it may prove 
afterward that the occurrence originally thought 
to be trivial results in serious injury.~' (ours) 
Plaintiff contends that the Doctrine of Trivial oc-
currence as above set forth applies in this case. Knowl-
edge that a claim would be presented did not come until 
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after 3 years had lapsed and immediately notice of this 
was given to the defendant. The requirement of notice 
under the policy 'vas met by the giving of this notice. 
The controlling issue in this case seems to be was 
notice of the accident given ''as soon as practicable'' as 
required by the policy~ In this connection the jury re-
turned to the Courtroom after deliberating for son1e 
time and inquired as to its legal definition. (R.320)~ 
The Court: ''Some question about the meaning of 
the phase 'as soon as practicable' : '' 
''The phrase 'as soon as practicable' means 
that the notice must be given within a reasonable 
time under the circumstances of the case. _.._-\_n in-
stantaneous notice is not contemplated, but rather 
notice to be given with reasonable dispatch and 
within a reasonable time in view of all of the 
facts and circumstances of the case. Now maybe 
that isn't helpful, but that is a legal definition'· 
(R.321). 
In Munz v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. 26 
Utah 69, 72 P. 182, 183, (1903) this court announced 
the rule: 
''It does not, by any fair construction of the 
policy, mean instantly, but 'immediate notice· 
means notice within a reasonable time, under all 
the circumstances of each particular case . . . 
It would, however, be both an unreasonable and 
unfair interpretation to hold that, as used in the 
policy, the word 'immediate' required the doing 
of a thing impossible for the be_neficiary to do. 
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Such provisions ntust receive reasonable construc-
tion in favor of the beneficiary.'' 
rrhP eourt eontiilllP~: 
'~ l\l a~·, in his work on Insurance, \ ... ol 2 See--
tion ±62, says : 'If the notice be required to be 
forthwith, or as soon as possible' or 'immediate-
ly' it will meet the requirement if given with due 
diligence under the circumstances of the case, and 
without unnecessary and unreasonable delay, of 
which the JURY ARE ORDINARILY TO BE 
rrHE JtTDGES (emphasis added). To give the 
word a literal interpretation would in most cases 
strip the insured of all hope of indemnity, and 
policies of insurance would become practically 
engines of fraud.'' 
The delay in this case was the fault of Blazer and 
not of the plaintiff. 
The jury therefore, in considering all of the evidence 
In thi~ ea~e properly concluded that notice was given 
''a~ ~oon a~ practicable'' and the verdict should not be 
reYel·~ed by thi~ court \vhieh did not hear all of the 
evidenee and -w·itness the demeanor of the witnesses who 
\Vere called to testify. The appellant is Inerely speculat-
ing \Yhen it concludes that the jury verdict was based 
upon an erronous instruction. The important question 
i~ 'vhether or not notice was given to the defendant 
''a!" soon as practicable'' and the jury by its verdict 
concluded that it was, and also concluded that the matter 
\Y'a~ of such a trivial nature as it appeared to plaintiff 
tl1at no notice was required until the letter from attor-
neY Olsen was received 3 years later. 
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r~oint II 
THERI~ WAS NO ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NO.9. 
'Phis instruction is fully set forth in appellants brief. 
The Inajor portion of this instruction was prepared from 
the case of Shafer t·. U.S. Casualty Co., Wash. 1916, 156 
P. 861. 
It is contended by the respondent that this instruc-
tion is fair and proper and a correct statement of the 
law. It is favorable to the appellant in the portion not 
requested by the plaintiff viz: that the witness Quinney 
\vas at all times an officer of the corp and that any 
notice received by Quinney would be notice to the corp. 
R155. 
The evidence referred to in point No. 1 and the 
portions of the record therein cited furnish ample evid-
ence that should justify the court in giving instruc-
tion No. 9. Without this instruction or a similar instruc-
tion covering the proposition envolved the jury \vould 
have had no guidance whatever with respect to plaintiff's 
theor~r of the case. Instructions as a "Thole ''rere a fair 
presentation of the theories of both parties and the 
jury under the instructions properly determined that 
the technical defense by the insurance con1pany~ that the 
company did not have notice, was not well taken. 
With respect to the contention that the instruction 
contains improper comment~ on the evidence the appel-
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lant cites the case of Fox v. Taylor (Utah 1960) 350 P. 
2d 154. In that case, as here, the so called comment 
(•ontplained of was in the instructions. The rule recog-
nized in the quote in the brief page 17 was not applied 
in the tase. In the next sentence the court decides that 
there ''Tas no offensive com1nent in the instruction and 
says: 
"Yet it must be realized that it is quite im-
possible to frame instructions applicable to a 
given case without making some reference to facts 
and sometimes evidence. The court elsewhere told 
the jury that it was their perogative to detern1ine 
the facts and they should do so solely upon the 
basis of the evidence.'' 
This case is an authority that the appellant's com-
plaint against instruction No. 9 is not well taken. 
Point III 
THE JURY PROPERLY DETERMINED THE 
ISS1-.-ES IN FA \ 10R OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
If there is any evidence and every reasonable infer-
ence fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light moat 
favorable to the plaintiff the verdict will not be inter-
fered with on appeal Holland v. Moreton (Utah 1960) 
353 P.2d 989 and a long line of earlier cases. 
Point IV 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
Without conceding any error in the record and for 
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the purpose of argu1nent only if it be assumed that the 
court erred in submitting question No. 1 to the jury, it 
would clearly appear that such error is entirely harmless 
under the peculiar facts of this case. Assuming that it 
was the duty of the plaintiff to give notice of the facts 
in this case such notice could have been nothing more 
than that Blazer had bu1nped his back on the plaintiff 
cement truck. That he stated at the time that he had not 
been injured and that the matter did not amount to any-
thing. That he continued at work the next day and for 
several days thereafter without complaint and on several 
occasions he talked to Mr. Taggart without complaining 
to him. If the insurance Company argues that this in-
formation would have permitted a nominal settlement 
with Blazer because he and all others concerned believed 
the accident to be trivial, it is contending that insurance 
is for the purpose of n1aking nominal settlements. Fail-
ure to give notice of these trivial facts could in no way 
have prejudiced the rights of defendant Rule 61, URCP, 
see also Startin v. Madsen, (120 Ut. 631) 237 P2d 834. 
CONCLUSION 
The court properly submitted the case to the jury 
on all questions of fact. Under the evidence the Jury 
not only properly decided the issues in favor of the 
plaintiff but it was their duty to do so. The judgment 
should be affirmed at appellants' costs. 
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Dated September 10, 1960. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRESTON & HARRIS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
Cache Valley Bank Bldg., 
Logan, Utah 
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